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 How Do Tourists React to Political Violence? 
An Empirical Analysis of Tourism in Egypt  
 
David Fielding




This paper uses a detailed database of political violence in Egypt to study European and 
US tourists’ attitudes towards travelling to a conflict region. We use time series 
analysis to study the heterogeneous impacts of different dimensions of political 
violence and counter-violence on tourist flows to Egypt in the 1990s. We find that 
both US and EU tourists respond negatively to attacks on tourists, but do not appear to 
be influenced by casualties arising in confrontations between domestic groups. 
However, European tourists are sensitive to the counter-violence measures 
implemented by the Egyptian government. There is also evidence of tourism in Egypt 
being affected by the Israeli / Palestinian conflict, with arrivals of tourists into Egypt 
rising when fatalities in Israel increase.  
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1. Introduction 
Egypt has seen several waves of Islamist violence against “soft” targets in the 
tourism sector. The first wave of attacks occurred in the 1990s culminating in the 
massacre at the temple of Hatshepsout near Luxor in 1998. More recent examples are 
the co-ordinated attacks on the Taba Hilton and Ras Satan in October 2004, on Sharm 
el-Sheik in July 2005 and the Khan-el-Khalili in Cairo in February 2009. Tourism is a 
major industry in Egypt, worth about 12.6bn US$ in 2009.
1 According to Tohamy and 
Swinscoe (2000), it accounted for 11.6% of GDP if one includes the secondary effects 
of tourist spending.  
  Even though the number of tourist victims in terrorist incidents tends to be 
relatively small and political violence represents only a negligible risk to an individual 
tourist, research shows that their effects on tourist numbers and tourism revenues can 
be severe, and violence in one destination induces a substitution effect between 
countries. The main themes explored in the empirical literature are (a) the extent and 
time profile of the substitution effect between countries suffering from political 
violence and safer choices;
2 (b) generalisation effects, where terrorism in one country 
cause a whole region to be perceived as risky;
3 (c) differences in attitudes to risks 
between countries.
4 
However, attacks on tourists are generally only a small part of a wider picture 
of political violence and instability.
5 Neumayer (2004) points out that the literature on 
violence and tourism has mostly focused on the issue of terrorism, rather than looking 
at political instability more generally. People may be put off travelling to a destination 
where there is a high level of political or inter-community tension even if it does not 
pose a direct threat to tourists and / or where ethical concerns are raised regarding the 
government’s treatment of the political opposition.
6 Neumayer demonstrates in his 
                                                 
1 http://www.euromonitor.com/factfile.aspx?country=EG. 
2E.g. Enders, et al  (1991); Enders et al  (1992); Drakos and Kutan (2003); Neumayer (2004), Fielding 
and Shortland (2009) 
3 E.g. Enders et al  (1992); Drakos and Kutan (2003). 
4 E.g. Tremblay (1989); Fielding and Shortland (2008). 
5 Targeting foreign nationals may be used by insurgent or opposition groups to generate national and 
international publicity in countries where the government tightly controls the local media. Disrupting 
the tourist industry also directly harms government revenues and foreign exchange receipts. Attacking 
foreigners may also have ideological objectives where tourists are targeted as the indirect 
representatives of different ideological values and political cultures (Aziz, 1996). 
6 See for example: http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/egypt.   2
2004 panel study that in both authoritarian countries and in countries in which human 
rights violations are common, tourist flows are reduced.   
This paper takes Neumayer’s innovation back to the country case study level 
and analyses the effects of several dimensions of political conflict on tourism in Egypt 
in the 1990s, where we have access to a highly detailed measure of political violence 
and counter-violence. The dataset records civilian, tourist and security force casualties 
as well as arrests of Islamists reported in the Egypt’s Al Ahram newspaper.
7 We 
analyse monthly data on tourism in Egypt where previously only annual data has been 
used.
8 
The paper firstly explores how tourists respond to various aspects of (Islamist) 
political violence directed against civilians. Secondly we explore the effects of 
counter-violence on tourist flows. The Egyptian government suppressed the 
opposition Islamist movements, rather than seeking political accommodation. The 
main approach has been to arrest and detain people suspected of political activism; 
but heavy-handed policing also resulted in civilian casualties in riots and 
demonstrations and gun-battles with armed extremists. Tourists are highly unlikely to 
become caught up in these security force activities, but may be put off by heavy 
security measures around tourist attractions or shun holidays in a location with a 
negative human rights image. 
Thirdly, we consider regional spill-over from the conflict in Israel/Palestine. 
On the one hand there is a high degree of substitutability between Red Sea resorts on 
the Egyptian and Israeli side of the border. On the other hand conflict in Israel may be 
expected to raise tension within Egypt
9 and has been directly linked to attacks on 
tourists on Egyptian soil. In all estimations we disaggregate between European and 
US tourists, who may have different attitudes to violence
10 and value Egyptian 
holidays for different reasons. These differences may make alternative destinations 
more or less easily substitutable.
11 
  Our results show that potential tourists substitute away from Egypt in response 
to violent attacks on tourists, but not to local tensions, and that the response of 
                                                 
7 See Fielding and Shortland (2010). 
8 Aly and Strazicich (2000); Sakr and Massoud (2003). 
9 Fielding and Shortland (2010). 
10 Fielding and Shortland (2008). 
11 Neumayer (2004).   3
European tourists is much more marked than that of tourists from the US. European 
tourists also respond negatively to the Egyptian government’s crackdowns on the 
Islamist opposition, while no such effect is observed for US tourists. Although Egypt 
sees additional tourist flows when violence in the Israeli / Palestinian conflict 
increases, Egypt’s government should be concerned about increasing tensions in 
Israel, because these sometimes result in violent attacks on Egyptian soil.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section 
reviews the literature on the effect of political violence on tourism and sets out our 
hypotheses. Section 3 gives some background information on the political conflict in 
Egypt and gives details on our measures of political violence. Section 4 describes the 
model of tourist destination choice; section 5 describes the data, estimations and 
results. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
There is now a growing literature on the economic effects of political violence on 
macroeconomic outcomes (much of which is reviewed in Frey et al., 2007). An 
important part of this literature investigates the effects of violent conflict on tourist 
destination choices. The typical modern tourist seeks relaxation and will switch 
between destinations in response to events that could potentially undermine the 
enjoyment of the holiday, even if the probability of being caught up in such an event 
is almost zero. The exact degree of substitution depends on whether a country’s 
attractions are specific to the country and particularly valued by tourists (e.g. “sunny 
beaches” versus unique cultural and geographical features).
12 Most of the literature 
focuses on the response of tourists to terrorist attacks, where tourists may be killed 
accidentally or deliberately targeted. The literature demonstrates significant, but 
temporary reductions in tourist flows in response to terrorist attacks in both country 
case studies and regional studies. However, there seem to be differences between 
countries in the time profile of the reaction of tourist arrivals and revenues, depending 
on the structure of the tourism industry (e.g. package holidays versus individual 
bookings) and how far in advance tourists generally book their holiday.
13  Knowing 
                                                 
12 Neumayer (2004). 
13 Enders and Sandler (1991), Enders et al. (1992), Fleischer and Buccola (2002), Pizam and Smith 
(2000); Pizam and Fleischer (2002).   4
the likely time profile of the response within a country is important information if the 
government decides to provide a subsidy to the tourism industry in response to 
terrorist attacks. While there are already two case studies confirming a temporary 
reduction in tourism to Egypt in response to violent events, both use annual data and 
focus on major violent events only.
14 There is also a question of the extent to which 
the severity of terrorist events matters for tourism. Pizam and Fleischer (2002) and 
Krakover (2001) show that tourism into Israel is negatively affected by the severity of 
terrorist attacks (in terms of the number of people killed and injured).
15 Sloboda 
(2003) and Ito and Lee (2005) focus on the effect of extraordinary events, showing 
large negative effects of the Gulf War of 1991 and the September 2001 attacks on US 
tourism flows. We use an index of the number of casualties as our measure of the 
severity of trans-national terrorist activity and in addition check whether the Luxor 
attack in November 1997 (which caused an unusually high number of casualties and 
was extensively covered in the international press) had a disproportionate effect on 
tourist flows.   
 
H1: Tourists substitute (temporarily) away from Egyptian holidays in response to 
terrorist attacks in Egypt directly involving tourists. Large scale attacks may have 
disproportionate effects.  
 
Neumayer (2004) looks at the effect of political instability and political 
violence more broadly in a dynamic cross country panel, arguing that tourists may 
also be put off by the repression of opposition movements, human rights abuses and 
police presence around tourist installations. He shows that tourists are affected in their 
destination choice not only by terrorist events, but also by violent political protest and 
repressive measures, such as restrictions of civil and political liberties, implemented 
by authoritarian governments. We re-examine this issue at the country level, where 
we are able to look at variations in political repression in much more detail than is 
                                                 
14 Aly and Strazicich (2000); Sakr and Massoud (2003) 
15 Pizam and Fleischer (2002) also show that a count variable of the number of terrorist attacks in Israel 
in a month is econometrically preferred to the monthly casualty count variable. In Egypt the number of 
months with more than one event is very low and we have not adopted this strategy.   5
possible using annual cross-country panel data. In such data sets, there are few (if 
any) variations in Egypt’s score for political and civil rights.
16  
 
H2: Tourists react negatively to an increase in political repression by the Egyptian 
government.  
H3: Tourists react negatively to an increase in intercommunity tensions and Islamist 
violence against local civilians and the state. 
 
The third issue we explore in this paper is the direction of spill-over effects 
from political violence in Israel / Palestine. Past studies have come to different 
conclusions about how violence in one country affects other countries in the same 
region. Some countries appear to have benefited from marketing themselves as “safe” 
alternative destinations within a region (Mansfeld 1996, Hall and Sullivan, 1996), but 
Drakos and Kutan (2003) demonstrate contagion (i.e. a negative externality) between 
Greece, Israel and Turkey. One would expect a positive effect if tourists substitute 
into holidays in Egypt when the threat of violence rises in Israel (the substitutability 
between Red Sea resorts being high). On the other hand, a negative effect could arise 
from generalisation effects.
17 In Egypt, this would be compounded by events in which 
Israelis (and hence other tourists) are targeted on Egyptian territory.
18 An increase in 




H4: Tourists will substitute holidays in Egypt for holidays in Israel in response to 
political tensions in Israel, unless these tensions spill over into Egypt. 
 
Finally, all of our estimates make use of disaggregated tourist flows, 
distinguishing between tourists from the United States and tourists from Europe.   
American and European tourists may have a different attitude to risk, violence and the 
visible presence of firearms on the street. The first reason is that people from a society 
                                                 
16 This is discussed in more detail in section 3. 
17 Drakos and Kutan (2003). 
18 For example the hotel bombings on the Sinai Peninsula and the killing of eighteen Greek tourists in 
Cairo in April 1996 in the mistaken belief that they were Israeli tourists. 
19 This is shown in Fielding and Shortland (2010).   6
with more intercommunity tension, crime and lax gun laws may be more confident 
about being able to avoid dangerous situations.
20 Secondly, US tourists are likely to 
choose an Egyptian holiday primarily for its cultural attractions, which are less easily 




H5: European tourists are more sensitive to violent events than American tourists. 
 
3. Historical background and measures of violent political conflict 
Egypt is a secular state in which Islamist movements have been excluded or 
marginalised from the political process. Islamist movements were banned under 
President Nasser, but a revival of Islamist groups started in the 1970s, their long-term 
goal being the establishment of an Islamic republic. Being excluded from the political 
process, some radical Islamist groups started a campaign of politically motivated 
violence. In the 1970s this was mainly inter-community violence between Islamists 
and the Coptic minority. In the 1980s violence increased in intensity in response to 
Egypt’s rapprochement with Israel and the government’s pro-Western stance. Attacks 
were increasingly targeted at the state, taking the form of riots, shoot-outs with the 
police and assassination attempts on politicians and other public figures (most notably 
the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981). In the early 1990s the conflict 
escalated in response to the violent repression of Islamist movements by the 
government.
22 
  International databases on political violence provide only a limited picture of 
the extent of political conflict intensity in Egypt, because they focus on trans-national 
terrorism and assassination attempts on important public figures, as reported in the 
international press.
23 Similarly, the Freedom House and Polity IV databases are able 
                                                 
20 Fielding and Shortland (2008). 
21 Neumayer (2004). 
22 The history of the conflict is discussed in detail in Abdo (2000) Wickham (2002). For an empirical 
study of the conflict see Fielding and Shortland (2010). 
23 The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism database lists 22 attacks in Egypt from 1990 to 
2000, 15 of which were targeted at the tourism industry.
  The Terrorism Research Centre lists 24 
terrorist incidents directed against tourists and politicians. The US Department of State’s publication 
“Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports 16 attacks against tourists and 6 attacks on political targets in.   7
to pick up only major changes in the government’s respect for civil liberties and the 
degree of political participation.
24 For this reason we use a detailed and unique 
database constructed from the news archive of Egypt’s largest daily paper Al Ahram.
25 
This provides details on Islamist violence against state and civilian targets, as well as 
the activities of the security forces, such as arrests, trials, executions and civilians 
being killed or wounded during demonstrations and gun-battles. Our dataset is more 
precise than those based on sources outside Egypt
26 although wee note that Islamist 
violence and counter-violence may have been subject to selective reporting. The 
Egyptian media are politically controlled
27 and NGOs are prevented from publishing 
independent statistics.
28 However, there is no evidence to suggest that there were 
major changes in editorial policy regarding what proportion and type of incidents are 
reported in the period under investigation. There is therefore no reason to suppose that 
there will be any bias in parameter estimates in a pure time-series model. In this paper 
we focus on the four dimensions of violence discussed below. 
 
Attacks on Tourists 
Attacks on tourists are illustrated in Figure 1. Attacks varied in severity, taking the 
form of sniper shooting at passing cruise ships, passenger trains and tourist buses, the 
bombing of buses and cafes and the shooting of foreigners at tourist attractions. The 
main series of 25 attacks against tourists started in August 1992, and attacks occurred 
every 2-6 months until March 1995. A further series of three attacks occurred between 
November 1995 and March 1996, and the final two attacks in September and 
November 1997, the last being shooting of 88 tourists and locals at the temple of 
Hatshepsout in Luxor. This massacre undermined public support for the Islamists and 
                                                                                                                                            
However, Egypt’s largest daily newspaper Al Ahram provided details of 39 attacks on the tourism 
industry alone, in 31 of which foreign nationals were wounded or killed. 
24 In 1993 Freedom House revised its evaluation of political rights and civil liberties in Egypt from 
“Partially Free” to “Not Free”; this rating remained constant for the remainder of our sample period. In 
the Marshall et al’s Polity IV database Egypt’s score on the Polity variable is -3 from 1990-1998 and 
then -6 for 1999 and 2000.  
25 The dataset was compiled for ESRC grant (RES-000-22-0312) and is available at 
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. 
26 Unfortunately it is only available for the 1990s. 
27 The editor of Al Ahram is appointed by the President. 
28 The publication Civil Society of the Ibn Khaldoun Centre has occasionally published political 
violence data, but details and updates are not available as the centre was closed and its founder and 
several of the research staff were arrested in 2000.   8
resulted in a huge increase in security measures around tourist attractions. There were 
no further attacks on tourists during the sample period. 
 
Islamist violence directed against Egyptians 
Our proxies for the level of community tension are based on the violence perpetrated 
by Islamist groups against Egyptians, illustrated in Figure 2. Islamist violence has 
taken a number of different forms, one aspect of which is inter-community violence, 
that is, assaults on the Coptic Christian minority. Many of these attacks were initially 
disputes about property or “protection money” but acquired political overtones. A 
second aspect is the attempt by Islamists to impose Shari’a laws in Egypt, attacking 
individuals and activities considered to be “un-Islamic”, such as liquor stores, beer 
deliveries, video-stores and cinemas showing foreign films, as well as individuals 
engaged in “vice”. There has also been some political violence connected to elections, 
during which supporters of different candidates have clashed in street fights. Thirdly, 
there have been assassination attempts on politicians and other public figures, such as 
poets, authors and academics, who have been singled out for the moral or religious 
views taken in their writing. Fourthly, security forces have been targeted directly by 
Islamist groups, or have been killed in gun battles linked to arrests. Figure 2 shows an 
escalation of political violence in 1992 and 1993, slowly tailing off from 1994 to 
1998. In 1999 one of the violent Islamist Organisations Al Gama’at al Islamiya 
initiated a ceasefire, but inter-community violence reignited in 2000.  
 
Counter-violence 
The Egyptian security forces’ response to Islamist violence reported in the Egyptian 
media includes arrests, detention (with and without trial) and death sentences for 
some of those convicted of terrorist offences.
29 The wording of the reports in Al 
Ahram suggests that members of the political opposition are regarded as “terrorist 
suspects”; or at least, that is how the government wishes the media to portray them.
30 
Arrests were sometimes preceded by gun battles in which both suspected Islamists 
                                                 
29 Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International additionally report widespread human 
rights violations, such as torture and deaths in custody, e.g. http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/egypt. 
30 E.g. Al Ahram reports arrests of “dangerous terrorists” during which security forces found “anti-
government leaflets” and “knives”, suggesting a rather more peaceful type of opposition.   9
and innocent bystanders were killed and wounded. Demonstrations have also been 
subject to heavy-handed policing, often resulting in casualties and large-scale arrests. 
We are not able to distinguish between different categories of civilians (political 
dissidents / extremists / bystanders), and so we aggregate all attacks on civilians. The 
number of civilians reported as being killed, wounded and arrested by the security 
forces are summarised in Figure 3. From January 1988 to December 2000 a total of 
19,915 arrests of suspected Islamists were reported by Al Ahram. In the same period 
605 civilians were killed and 556 civilians were wounded by the security forces and 
114 death sentences were reported to have been carried out.
31 
 
Conflict in Israel 
Violence in Israel and the West Bank and Gaza is illustrated in Figure 4. The data are 
provided by the Israeli NGO B’Tselem.
32 Fatalities among Israelis in Israel, which are 
the best proxy for the risk to tourists in Israel, are highest in the period 1994-1996. 
Fatalities among the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which might fuel anti-
Israeli and anti-Western sentiment in Egypt, were relatively high between 1990 and 
1994, relatively low between 1995 and 1999 and rose sharply with the beginning of 
the second Intifada in September 1999.  
 
 
4:  A Model of Tourist Destination Choice 
In this section we derive a regression equation for demand for tourism in Egypt. This 
is based on the standard discrete choice theory in Maddala (1983). The model 
concerns a population of people who have already decided to take a vacation, and are 
deciding where to go.
33 Let the net utility an individual i derives from taking a 
vacation in location m  {1,..., M} in month t be designated vimt. We will assume that 
each person’s utility is of the form: 
 
vimt = mt (Xmt, mt) + uimt         ( 1 )  
                                                 
31 In the estimations below we use politically motivated arrests (cas) to capture the intensity of 
Egyptian counter-violence efforts 
32 http://www2.iol.co.il/btselem. 
33 See Enders et al  (1992) for an explicit model of a two-stage budgeting decision.   10
 
where mt is the average level of utility from visiting location m in month t for the 
vacationing population and uimt is an individual’s idiosyncratic deviation from this 
average. Xmt is a vector of identifiable time-varying factors that impact on one’s net 
utility from a vacation in a particular location (including how expensive it is), and mt 
is a stochastic term reflecting the unpredictable component of the average utility level 
(fads and fashions). We further assume that individual i chooses location m in period t 
if and only if: 
 
vimt = max (vi1t,..., viMt)         ( 2 )  
 
It can be shown (Maddala, 1983) that if for any two locations (m,n) the distribution of 
uimt is independent of that of  uint, and if each has a Weibull distribution,
34 then the 











         ( 3 )  
So, for a large population, the ratio of the number of people in period t visiting 
location m (pmt) to the number visiting location n (pnt) can be written as: 
 




ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = mt (Xmt, mt) – nt (Xnt, nt)        ( 5 )  
 
Location m here is to be interpreted as Egypt; the identity of the reference location n 
will be discussed later.  If we know the functional forms of mt (.) and nt (.), then we 
can fit equation (6) to time-series data. In what follows, we assume that it is possible 
to find a linear specification such that: 
                                                 
34 Appendix I discusses the relaxation of this assumption.   11
 
ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = ′ [Xmt – Xnt] + t        ( 6 )  
 
where t is a linear function of mt and nt.  
  We will proceed with the assumption that [Xmt – Xnt] comprises (a) seasonal 
factors, (b) the relative enjoyability of the two locations and (c) the several 
dimensions of political violence in Egypt and Israel. Our regressions are based on an 
equation of the form: 
 
ln(pmt) – ln(pnt) = ss.hst + .E[wmt – wnt] + ′ E[Zmt+1] + ′ Zmt + t   (7) 
 
hst is a dummy for month s. wmt is the enjoyability of location m in period t, to which 
an expectations operator is attached, because new visitors will only find out whether 
they like a place when they get there. Zmt is a vector of violence indicators in Egypt, 
the reference location n being assumed to be completely safe. Tourists are concerned 
about violence in the current month and also expected violence in the next month, 
because visits may straddle two months.  
One might also wonder whether monthly variations in the relative cost of 
different locations make a difference to tourist numbers. However, our empirical 
measures of relative cost never produced robust, interpretable statistically significant 
coefficients. It seems that, in our sample period at least, monthly variations in cost 
had no substantial impact on tourism to Egypt. 
Application of the model requires us to specify the expectations formation 
process. We will work with the following assumptions: 
 
E[wmt – wnt] = (L)[ln(pmt-1) – ln(pnt-1)]       (8) 
 
E[Zmt] = (L)′ Zmt-1                            (9) 
 
Equation (9) builds some herding behaviour into the model: if a destination has been 
popular in the past, people are more likely to consider it today. Equation (10) states   12
that expectations about the current risk of violence are based on the past frequency of 
violent incidents. Substituting equations (9-10) into equation (8), we will have an 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) equation of the form:  
 
(L)[ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] = ss.hst + (L)′ Zmt + t                   (10) 
 
The elements of the violence vector Z are as follows. 
 
ln(1 + tkw), where tkw is the number of tourists killed and wounded in Egypt. 
ln(1 + cas), where cas is the number of arrests by Egyptian security forces.  
ln(1 + csk), where csk is the number of civilians and security forces killed by radicals.  
ln(1 + iki), where iki is the number of Israelis killed in political attacks in Israel.  
ln(1 + kwg), where kwg  is the number of deaths in fighting in the West Bank / Gaza. 
 
We expect the coefficients on these variables to be negative (H1-H4), and larger in 
absolute size for European tourists than for American tourists (H5). 
 
Logarithmic transformations are used to ensure that the variables are approximately 
symmetrically distributed. ADF tests for the order of integration of the variables 
indicate them all to be I(0); further details are available on request. 
 
 
5. Empirical Modelling and Data 
5.1 Data 
Our sample period covers the 1990s, starting in March 1991 (to exclude any effects 
from the first Gulf war) and ending December 2000, the last month for which political 
violence data are available. Equation (11) is to be fitted to data for tourist arrivals into 
Egypt from (a) America and (b) Western Europe. In order to estimate the parameters 
of equation (11), we need to construct a dependent variable in which the number of 
visitors to Egypt from a certain population (American and European tourists   13
respectively) is expressed relative to the number of visitors from that population to 
another location.  
We use tourist flows to two comparison countries, which both have consistent 
datasets of monthly tourist arrivals disaggregated by nationality for the sample period. 
Firstly we use tourism data from Malta, which can be considered as a “safe” 
alternative destination in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ideally we would use a larger 
selection of destinations in the Mediterranean, such as Spain, Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus, but it was impossible to obtain monthly data disaggregated by nationality for 
the required period. Moreover, the recent history of these countries means that they 
cannot be considered 100% safe.
35  
Malta receives a relatively small number of tourists compared to Egypt 
(particularly from the United States), introducing the potential for excessive noise in 
the ratio of tourist arrivals to the two destinations.
36 We therefore also use Thailand as 
an alternative comparison country. Thailand has the advantage of generating tourist 
flows comparable to those into Egypt.
37 Thailand offers a similar mixture of beach 
holidays and cultural attractions to Egypt,
38 but did not experience violent attacks on 
foreign citizens during the period.
39 For the American (European) tourist sample, pmt 
is interpreted as the number of American (European) visitors to Egypt in a particular 
month and pnt is interpreted as the number of American (European) visitors to Malta / 
Thailand. The Egyptian Ministry of Tourism provides detailed statistics of monthly 
arrivals of tourists, as well as a breakdown of these tourists into American and 
European visitors in its annual publication “Tourism in Figures”. The data on tourist 
arrivals into Malta are from Malta’s National Statistics Office.
40 Data on tourist 
arrivals into Thailand were provided by the Thai ministry of tourism.  
                                                 
35 See Drakos and Kutan (2003) for an overview of terrorist events in Greece and Turkey and Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003) for Spain. 
36 From January 1991 to December 2000 the average number of EU visitors to Malta was 45.6% of 
average EU tourist arrivals into Egypt. For US tourists Malta was a much less likely holiday destination 
with visits to Malta being just under 6% of the number of visits to Egypt.  Indeed the US Malta series 
has a number of spikes between January 1991 to September 1992, introducing parameter instability and 
leptokurtic errors. So we report the regression results for data from 1993 onwards. 
37 In 1995 Thailand recorded an average 23,790 US visitor arrivals per month versus 19,108 in Egypt; 
in 2000 this had increased to 43,171 in Thailand and 28,392 in Egypt. 
38 See for example http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/th for information about UNESCO world 
heritage sites in Thailand and further information at http://www.thailandsworld.com/index.cfm?p=728. 
39 Terrorist attacks started in 2004 in Southern Thailand. 
40 http://www.nso.gov.mt/.   14
The five violence variables are measured using the data collated from Al 
Ahram and from the B’Tselem database, which are described in Section 3 above. In all 
cases the violence statistics are expressed in terms of (the log of) the number of 
fatalities or arrests per month. All equations also include seasonally varying intercepts 
to take into account variations in tourist flows according to holiday periods and 




Tables 1-4 report parameter estimates for our two samples – American and European 
tourists – and the two comparison countries – Malta and Thailand. (Descriptive 
statistics for the variables in Tables 1-4 are presented in Appendix II.) The results 
change slightly when we switch between Malta and Thailand as the control 
destination. This may reflect the fact that we are capturing the behaviour of two 
slightly different vacationing populations: those with a specific preference for the 
Mediterranean, who are making a decision at the margin between Egypt and places 
like Malta, and those with no such geographical preference, who are making a 
decision at the margin between Egypt and places further afield, such as Thailand.  We 
use a lag order of three, selected on the basis of the Akaike Criterion: higher order 
lags were not statistically significant. Appendix III discusses the stability of the 
parameters in the four tables. 
  Lags of the csk and kwg variables (measuring intercommunity tensions in 
areas which tourists generally avoid) are never statistically significant in any 
regression equation. We therefore have no evidence regarding hypothesis 3 for this 
particular period. The intercommunity violence variables were excluded from the 
regressions reported in Tables 1-4 below.  
  The first part of tables 1-4 reports the regressions with the three elements of Z 
that are ever significant: tkw (tourist injuries and fatalities), cas (politically motivated 
arrests by the security forces) and iki (Israeli deaths in mainland Israel). The second 
part of each table reports the parameters of corresponding equations in which the 
dynamics are further restricted so as to minimize the Akaike Criterion for the 
regressions. It can be seen that these restrictions make no substantial difference to 
those coefficients that are statistically significant in the unrestricted model. Test   15
statistics indicate that the null of zero autocorrelation in the regression residuals (and 
residual variances) cannot be rejected; neither can one reject the null that the residuals 
are normally distributed. For the European / Thailand sample, normality of the 
residual is achieved only when a dummy variable for the major incident at the temple 
of Hatshepsut in 1997 is included. The inclusion of this dummy significantly reduces 
the regression coefficient for tkw, but the tkw and December 1997 coefficients should 
be read together as an indication of the (nonlinear) impact of increased violence.  
  From tables 1-4 we therefore find clear evidence for the first hypothesis:   
tourists react negatively to attacks targeted at the tourism industry resulting in the loss 
of life or injuries. There is also some evidence that European tourists react particularly 
strongly to (well publicised) large-scale events. Hypothesis 2 is only confirmed in the 
European sample: on average, European tourists respond to changes in the level of the 
state’s response to political challenge, while American tourists do not seem to pay any 
attention to this dimension of the conflict. There is no significant response of 
American tourist numbers to changes in cas, even in the short run. Both European and 
American tourists react similarly to changes in the number of Israeli victims in 
Palestinian suicide attacks.  
  To explore these differences between American and European tourists in a 
more intuitive way, we do not dwell on the individual regression coefficients, but 
interpret the regression dynamics by plotting the implicit response of [ln(pmt) – ln(pnt)] 
to temporary unit increases in each of the elements of Z.
41 The plots, based on the 
coefficients reported in the restricted regression equations in Figures 5-8. Note that a 
change in cas (and iki in the Americans / Thailand regression) has no impact on 
American tourist numbers, even in the short run, because the respective elements of 
are insignificantly different from zero. A common feature of all these figures is that 
the effects of a temporary increase in violence are very short-lived: either people have 
short memories, or they know (at least intuitively) that shocks to a stationary violence 
series do not persist indefinitely. A year afterwards, tourist numbers have recovered 
almost to their initial level. However, there is a lag of a few months in the effect of an 
upsurge in violence: in all but a couple of cases, the effect of an increase in violence 
on tourism peaks at the third or fourth month after the event. Tourist numbers do not 
                                                 
41 For these illustrative purposes, we assume that each element of Z is strictly exogenous, and hold the 
other elements constant in each case. The figures are designed to provide an intuitive picture of the 
dynamics of the regression equations; they are not impulse response functions in the strict sense.   16
adjust instantaneously in response to an upsurge in violence: people appear generally 
not to cancel vacations they have already booked when the violence increases.
42  
  Comparing figures 5(a) and 6(a) (the American response to tourists killed and 
wounded) to the equivalent reaction of European tourists, figures 7(a) and 8(a), we 
see that European tourists react much more sensitively to violence than American 
tourists, the maximum contraction being more than twice as deep as for American 
tourists. However, the time profile of the response is very similar for the two 
populations. Figures 5(b), 7(b) and 8(b) show responses of a similar magnitude to 
increases in violent deaths in Israel, but the American tourists are quicker to react than 
European tourists. In both cases the effects of temporary shocks disappear after a 
year.  
  Solving out the dynamics of the regression equations, we can also compute 
“long-run” elasticities that predict the impact on tourism of a hypothetical permanent 
change in the level of violence. (Although the historical violence series we are using 
are stationary, it is always possible that there will be a structural break in one of the 
series in the future. Indeed, there was such a break in the Israeli fatality data just after 
the end of our sample, with the onset of the al Aqsa Intifada.) In the long run, the 
elasticity for Americans reacting to a permanent increase in the level of violence 
against tourists is around -0.6 to -0.9. The effect on European tourist numbers is 
somewhat larger. For the Europeans / Malta regressions the elasticity is around -1.3. 
In the Europeans / Thailand regressions the elasticity is lower at around -0.5, but there 
is an additional and much larger effect from the attack on tourists in Luxor in 1997, 
which suggests that European might be particularly sensitive to large-scale attacks. 
 
Long run elasticities of tourist numbers to a permanent increase in violence 








1 + tkw -0.882  -0.564  -1.296  -0.489 
1 + iki 0.354  0.292  0.338  insignificant 
1 + cas  insignificant insignificant -0.125 -0.098 
                                                 
42 This is consistent with Pizam and Fleischer (2002) reporting that tourists (to Israel in their case) 
mostly book their holidays within the four months preceding their visit.   17
Luxor massacre 1997        -4.839 
 
  Comparing the long-run tkw elasticities for Europeans / Malta and Americans / 
Malta, and comparing the long-run tkw and Luxor massacre elasticities for Europeans 
/ Thailand and Americans / Thailand, we can see that the contraction for European 
tourists in a the wake of a tourist attack is generally more pronounced than for 
American tourists, and (as the graphs show) European numbers take slightly longer to 
recover. Both the graphical analysis and the elasticities provide clear confirmation of 
Hypothesis 5, which predicted a larger reaction on average among the Europeans the 
majority of whom travel to Egypt for the year-round sun and sand, and less for its 
cultural attractions.  
  Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed in that Americans and Europeans appear to 
substitute between Egypt and Israel as tourist destinations: there is increasing the 
demand for Egyptian holidays, if the risk of travelling in Israel increases, as indicated 
in Figures 5(b), 7(b) and 8(b). The Americans / Malta regressions indicate that a unit 
increase in ln(1 + iki) leads to an immediate 5% increase in American numbers, 
increasing to around 35% in the long run (marginally significant). The Americans / 
Thailand regressions indicate a long-run effect of 30% (again marginally 
significant).
43 European arrivals into Egypt increase by 3 -5 per cent after a small lag. 
The long run elasticity in the Malta regressions is 0.34, whereas in the Thai 
regressions it is lower and not statistically significant, suggesting that some caution is 
appropriate in interpreting this result. 
  The main difference between American and European tourists is in their 
reaction to the Egyptian security forces response to political violence. Figure 7(c) and 
8(c) show the effect of a unit increase in the arrests variable cas on European tourists. 
Demand for Egyptian holidays contracts by 1-2% with a unit increase in ln(1 + cas) 
soon after the shock and if the crackdown is sustained in the long run, tourist numbers 
drop by 10-12%.
44 Thus on average, European tourists do respond to changes in the 
level of the state’s response to insurgency, which might be viewed by some as 
                                                 
43 In the Americans / Thailand unrestricted regression the positive coefficients on contemporaneous 
ln(1 + iki) are not significant and the AIC indicates the omission of contemporaneous ln(1 + iki) from 
the regression. 
44 These long run coefficients are highly significant.   18
excessive. American tourists seem not to pay any attention to this dimension of the 
conflict.
45  
  The results are mostly robust to the choice of comparison country (i.e. Malta 
or Thailand) and we are therefore confident that the empirical results generated are 
not spurious. The main discrepancy between the samples is that the Europeans / 
Thailand regressions indicate a particularly strong response to a large-scale terrorist 
attack and a lesser response to incidents which affect only a small number of people, 
while the Europeans / Malta regressions suggest a strong response to all types of 
attacks.  
 
6. Interpretation and Conclusion 
Our results show that the campaign of radical Islamist organisations succeeded in 
inflicting heavy losses on the Egyptian tourist industry when their attacks were 
directly targeted at the tourist industry, confirming Hypothesis 1. Even though the 
actual danger of being caught up in a violent attack was extremely small even at the 
height of the conflict, many tourists decided to stay away from Egypt. Direct attacks 
on tourist installations in which foreign citizens are killed or wounded have an 
immediate effect on people’s destination choices when making bookings
46 and it takes 
more than a year before tourist numbers fully recover after a successful attack. If 
tourist flows in the aftermath of an attack are stimulated by aggressive price cuts, the 
actual cost to the tourist industry is likely to be significantly higher than suggested by 
the contraction in tourist numbers.
47 In addition there is some evidence that European 
tourists react disproportionately to attacks in which there are large numbers of foreign 
victims, as indicated by the large and highly significant coefficient on the Luxor 
temple incident. 
  Hypothesis 2 is supported by the evidence as Egypt’s human rights record 
does appear to have featured to some extent in European citizens’ holiday destination 
                                                 
45 If anything a positive coefficient on the long-run elasticity suggests that Americans are reassured by 
a strong security force response to Islamist violence. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
46 The maximum effect appears to occur at the point corresponding to the average tourist’s advance 
booking between 3 and 4 months ahead of the holiday. 
47 Tourism revenues have been shown to take much longer to recover than the number of tourists 
(Tohamy and Swinscoe, 2000). Local hotel prices will be endogenous, which is the reason for their 
exclusion from the regression equations. To the extent that tourist numbers impact on prices, our test 
equation should be viewed as a reduced-form expression.    19
choices. If the security forces crack-down is a one-off event, the response is relatively 
small and short-lived. However, a long-term, heavy-handed security policy appears to 
discourage significant numbers of Europeans from considering an Egyptian holiday. 
As European arrivals make up about 60% of total tourism to Egypt (versus 6.5% for 
the US); the Egyptian government should at least consider this effect when designing 
its security policy. 
  We have no evidence for our hypothesis 3. Tourists appear to have cared 
mainly about their own safety, rather than being influenced by low level political 
conflict between local groups, where the relevant locations can easily be avoided.
48 
While this refutes hypothesis 3 in the sample analysed here, it is possible that this 
result would be different after September 2001. People have become more concerned 
about Islamist movements and about local tensions bubbling over into violent attacks 
on foreign interests and this issue will be investigated in future work.  
    Conflict in Israel has an ambiguous effect on the Egyptian tourist industry. 
As outlined in hypothesis 4 tourists seem to substitute holidays in Egypt for holidays 
in Israel when violence increases in Israel. This is probably due to the high degree of 
substitutability between different Red Sea beach resorts. However, political violence 
in Israel does occasionally spill over into Egypt, such as the attacks on tourists and 
hotels in the Sinai.
49 This has unambiguously negative consequences for the Egyptian 
tourism industry, underlining the importance of the Egyptian government’s 
involvement in the Middle East peace process. 
  Finally, hypothesis 5 is confirmed by the interesting differences between US 
and European tourists. European tourists are more sensitive to political violence in 
Egypt than their American counterparts. This may be because a large number of 
Europeans go to Egypt on beach holidays, for which there are many (safe) alternative 
destinations. European tourists therefore react very strongly to violence against the 
tourism industry. For US tourists the emphasis is more likely to be on Egypt’s 
archaeological attractions, for which there are no close substitutes. Europeans also 
respond negatively to scaled up counter-violence operations (which in Egypt often 
ignore human rights), whereas US tourists do not. One possible explanation is that 
human rights issues are less well publicised in the US media than in Europe, whereas 
                                                 
48 That is local, intercommunity violence in Egypt and fighting in the West Bank and Gaza. 
49 Fielding and Shortland (2010).   20
attacks on foreigners do make international headlines and influence (in-) official 
travel advice. Another possible explanation is that the average American tourist may 
be more relaxed about the presence of armed guards around tourist venues or even 
reassured by a strong state response to terrorist threats. 
  Given these results there are strong policy implications regarding the 
importance of not letting a political conflict escalate to the point where radical splinter 
groups attack foreign nationals to publicise their cause. However, a heavy-handed 
state policy against the Islamist opposition can also have negative effects on tourism. 
There is some evidence for such an effect with respect to European tourists, who 
provide the majority of tourism receipts in Egypt. The results might also motivate a 
policy of subsidising the tourism sector in response to attacks on tourists until tourism 
levels recover a year later. Finally, efforts to revise the image of Egypt through 
advertising campaigns in the aftermath of attacks should be primarily directed at the 
European tourist market, which reacts very sensitively to violence and provides the 
majority of tourism revenues for Egypt. 
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Table 1: ln(pm/pn)t regression, American sample, Malta as comparison 
Sample period: 1993m1 – 2000m12* 

  unrestricted  restricted 
  coeff.  h.c.s.e. t ratio ptl. R
2 coeff. h.c.s.e.  t ratio  ptl. R
2
ln(pm/pn)-1  0.3468  0.0995 3.48 0.1497 0.4505 0.1023  4.40  0.1970
ln(pm/pn)-2  0.3116  0.1013 3.08 0.1206 0.3689 0.0875  4.22  0.1836
ln(pm/pn)-3  0.1359  0.0903 1.50 0.0318   
ln(1 + cas)  -0.0016  0.0104 -0.16 0.0004       
ln(1 + cas)-1  0.0128  0.0110 1.17 0.0195       
ln(1 + cas)-2  0.0048  0.0124 0.39 0.0022       
ln(1 + cas)-3  0.0073  0.0096 0.76 0.0083   
ln(1 + tkw)  -0.0268  0.0226 -1.19 0.0200   
ln(1 + tkw)-1  -0.0508  0.0183 -2.77 0.1002 -0.0327 0.0149  -2.19  0.0575
ln(1 + tkw)-2  -0.0672  0.0188 -3.58 0.1567 -0.0444 0.0153  -2.90  0.0961
ln(1 + tkw)-3  -0.0367  0.0188 -1.95 0.0522   
ln(1 + iki)  0.0323  0.0214 1.51 0.0319 0.0403 0.0165  2.44  0.0699
ln(1 + iki)-1  0.0181  0.0171 1.06 0.0160       
ln(1 + iki)-2  0.0047  0.0232 0.20 0.0006   
ln(1 + iki)-3  0.0176  0.0208 0.85 0.0103       
               
 0.1517       0.1495     
R
2  0.8326       0.8140     
adjusted R
2  0.3880       0.3200     
log likelihood  60.660       55.607     
AIC  -3.5391       -3.6422     
SC  -2.8179       -3.1881     
normality test  (2) = 1.8956 [0.3876]    (2) =3.5604 [0.1686]   
heterosk. test        F(41,27) = 0.3779 [0.9976]         F(21,57) = 0.7958 [0.7127]   
RESET test        F(1,68) = 2.3524 [0.1297]         F(1,78) = 2.1959 [0.1424]   
AR(1) test        F(1,68) = 1.2381 [0.2697]         F(1,78) = 2.7908 [0.0988]   
ARCH(1)  test        F(1,67) = 0.0149 [0.9033]         F(1,77) = 0.0132 [0.9088]   

All standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity, seasonal intercepts included   24
Table 2: ln(pm/pn)t regression, American sample, Thailand as comparison 
Sample period: 1991m4 – 2000m12* 
 
  unrestricted  restricted 
  coeff.  h.c.s.e. t ratio ptl. R
2 coeff. h.c.s.e.  t ratio  ptl. R
2
ln(pm/pn)-1  0.3652  0.0985 3.71 0.1325 0.3983 0.0837  4.76  0.1833
ln(pm/pn)-2  0.3687  0.1086 3.39 0.1135 0.3712 0.0838  4.43  0.1628
ln(pm/pn)-3  0.0303  0.0935 0.32 0.0012   
ln(1 + cas)  0.0036  0.0091 0.40 0.0017       
ln(1 + cas)-1  0.0010  0.0105 0.10 0.0001       
ln(1 + cas)-2  -0.0005  0.0110 -0.04 0.0000       
ln(1 + cas)-3  0.0038  0.0086 0.45 0.0022   
ln(1 + tkw)  -0.0204  0.0146 -1.40 0.0214   
ln(1 + tkw)-1  -0.0198  0.0164 -1.21 0.0159   
ln(1 + tkw)-2  -0.0515  0.0134 -3.85 0.1414 -0.0384 0.0125  -3.06  0.085
ln(1 + tkw)-3  -0.0413  0.0136 -3.04 0.0930 -0.0320 0.0139  -2.30  0.0498
ln(1 + iki)  0.0198  0.0158 1.25 0.0172       
ln(1 + iki)-1  0.0161  0.0216 0.75 0.0061       
ln(1 + iki)-2  0.0139  0.0139 1.01 0.0111   
ln(1 + iki)-3  0.0191  0.0156 1.22 0.0163       
               
 0.1316       0.1288     
R
2  0.7591       0.7411     
adjusted R
2  0.3739       0.3270     
log likelihood  86.580       82.356     
AIC  -3.8563       -3.9722     
SC  -3.2189       -3.5944     
normality test  (2) = 0.7525 [0.6864]    (2) = 2.6919 [0.2603]   
heterosk. test        F(41,48) = 0.3697 [0.9993]         F(19,81) = 0.6886 [0.8196]   
RESET test        F(1,89) = 0.3755 [0.5416]          F(1,100) = 0.8920 [0.3472]   
AR(1) test        F(1,89) = 1.2333 [0.2698]         F(1,100) = 0.1390 [0.7100]   
ARCH(1)  test        F(1,88) = 0.1093 [0.7418]         F(1,99) = 0.9337 [0.3363]   
 
All standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity, seasonal intercepts included 
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Table 3: ln(pm/pn)t regression, European sample, Malta as comparison 
Sample period: 1991m4 – 2000m12* 
 
  unrestricted  restricted 
  coeff.  h.c.s.e. t ratio ptl. R
2 coeff. h.c.s.e.  t ratio  ptl. R
2
ln(pm/pn)-1  0.5446  0.1118 4.87 0.2086 0.5377 0.0699  7.69  0.3789
ln(pm/pn)-2  -0.0154  0.0894 -0.17 0.0003       
ln(pm/pn)-3  0.2727  0.0521 5.24 0.2337 0.2661 0.0633  4.20  0.1540
ln(1 + cas)  -0.0214  0.0112 -1.91 0.0390 -0.0246 0.0100  -2.46  0.0588
ln(1 + cas)-1  0.00444  0.0122 0.36 0.0015       
ln(1 + cas)-2  0.0002  0.0099 0.02 0.0000       
ln(1 + cas)-3  -0.0076  0.0102 -0.75 0.0062       
ln(1 + tkw)  -0.0085  0.0176 -0.484 0.0026       
ln(1 + tkw)-1  -0.0902  0.0282 -3.20 0.1023 -0.0876 0.0266  -3.29  0.1005
ln(1 + tkw)-2  -0.0548  0.0241 -2.28 0.0545 -0.0548 0.0213  -2.57  0.0638
ln(1 + tkw)-3  -0.1100  0.0243 -4.53 0.1856 -0.1119 0.0211  -5.30  0.2244
ln(1 + iki)  0.0332  0.0123 2.71 0.0753 0.0290 0.0135  2.14  0.0451
ln(1 + iki)-1  -0.0247  0.0179 -1.38 0.0207       
ln(1 + iki)-2  0.0428  0.0180 2.38 0.0591 0.0374 0.0168  2.23  0.0488
ln(1 + iki)-3  0.0113  0.0210 0.54 0.0032       
               
 0.1463       0.1432     
R
2  0.9584       0.9571     
adjusted R
2  0.4865       0.4700     
log likelihood  74.199      72.3577     
AIC  -3.6447       -3.7329     
SC  -3.0073       -3.2607     
normality test  (2) = 1.5734 [0.4553]    (2) = 1.0942 [0.5786]   
heterosk. test        F(41,48) = 1.3827 [0.1397]         F(27,69) = 2.1535 [0.0056]   
RESET test        F(1,89) = 0.3223 [0.5717]         F(1,96) = 0.2082 [0.6492]   
AR(1) test        F(1,89) = 0.2789 [0.5987]         F(1,96) = 0.2531 [0.6161]   
ARCH(1)  test        F(1,88) = 0.1414 [0.7078]         F(1,95) = 0.0008 [0.9780]   
 
All standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity, seasonal intercepts included 
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Table 4: ln(pm/pn)t regression, European sample, Thailand as comparison 
Sample period: 1991m4 – 2000m12* 
 
  unrestricted   restricted
  coeff.  h.c.s.e. t ratio ptl. R
2 coeff. h.c.s.e.  t ratio  ptl. R
2
ln(pm/pn)-1  0.3157  0.0997 3.17 0.1045 0.3616 0.1040  3.48  0.1162
ln(pm/pn)-2  0.1935  0.0842 2.30 0.0580 0.1739 0.0741  2.35  0.0565
ln(pm/pn)-3  0.1834  0.0608 3.02 0.0956 0.1803 0.0690  2.61  0.0691
ln(1 + cas)  -0.0040  0.0081 -0.49 0.0028       
ln(1 + cas)-1  -0.0109  0.0069 -1.59 0.0285       
ln(1 + cas)-2  -0.0022  0.0085 -0.25 0.0007       
ln(1 + cas)-3  -0.0130  0.0076 -1.71 0.0329 -0.0159 0.0071  -2.24  0.0516
ln(1 + tkw)  -0.0277  0.0128 -2.16 0.0514 -0.0346 0.0105  -3.30  0.1060
ln(1 + tkw)-1  -0.0280  0.0196 -1.43 0.0232 -0.0396 0.0224  -1.77  0.0329
ln(1 + tkw)-2  -0.0461  0.0146 -3.15 0.1032 -0.0546 0.0141  -3.88  0.1407
ln(1 + tkw)-3  -0.0513  0.0170 -3.01 0.0954 -0.0566 0.0168  -3.37  0.1099
ln(1 + iki)  -0.0013  0.0125 -0.10 0.0001       
ln(1 + iki)-1  -0.0173  0.0152 -1.13 0.0147       
ln(1 + iki)-2  0.0308  0.0159 1.94 0.0421 0.0306 0.0163  1.88  0.0370
ln(1 + iki)-3  0.0102  0.0144 0.71 0.0058       
D97m12  -0.6869  0.1104 -6.22 0.3106 -0.5922 0.0995  -5.95  0.2779
D97m12-1  -0.4373  0.0960 -4.56 0.1944 -0.3696 0.0881  -4.20  0.1606
D97m12-2  -0.1476  0.0833 -1.77 0.0353 -0.0944 0.0754  -1.25  0.0168
D97m12-3  -0.2152  0.0581 -3.70 0.1375 -0.1625 0.0496  -3.27  0.1044
               
 0.1076       0.1071     
R
2  0.9557       0.9531     
adjusted R
2  0.5883       0.5638     
log likelihood  112.86       109.47     
AIC  -4.2371       -4.2818     
SC  -3.5053       -3.6916     
normality test  (2) = 0.8298 [0.6604]    (2) = 0.4440 [0.8009]   
heterosk. test        F(45,40) = 0.5385 [0.9775]         F(33,58) = 0.8698 [0.6622]   
RESET test        F(1,85) = 0.8159 [0.3689]         F(1,91) = 0.6424 [0.4249]   
AR(1) test        F(1,85) = 1.2652 [0.2638]         F(1,91) = 2.6835 [0.1048]   
ARCH(1)  test        F(1,84) = 0.0147 [0.9037]         F(1,90) = 0.6441 [0.4244]   

All standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity, seasonal intercepts included 
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Figure 1: Attacks on Tourists 
□  tourists killed        ■ tourists wounded 
■ tourists attacked without injury 
 
Figure 2: Islamist Violence against Egyptians 
□ civilians wounded by civilians    ■ security forces wounded 
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Figure 3: Security Force Actions 
□ civilians wounded by security forces   ■ arrests (x 0.1) 
■ civilians killed by security forces    
 
Figure 4: The Israel / Palestine Conflict 
□ Palestinians killed in WBG     ■ Israelis killed in WBG 
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses for Americans / Malta 








(a) Response of American tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the number 
of tourists attacked in Egypt (ln(1 + tkw)), first 12 months 









(b) Response of American tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the number 
of violent deaths in Israel (ln(1 + iki)), first 12 months   30
Figure 6: Impulse Responses for Americans / Thailand 












(a) Response of American tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the number 
of tourists attacked in Egypt (ln(1 + tkw)), first 12 months   31
Figure 7: Impulse Responses for Europeans / Malta 









a)  Response of European tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the 
number of tourists attacked in Egypt (ln(1 + tkw)), first 12 months 









b)  Response of European tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the 
number of violent deaths in Israel (ln(1 + iki)), first 12 months  
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c)  Response of European tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the 
number of suspected Islamists arrested (ln(1 + cas)), first 12 months 
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses for Europeans / Thailand 











a)  Response of European tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the 
number of tourists attacked in Egypt (ln(1 + tkw)), first 12 months 








b)  Response of European tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the 
number of violent deaths in Israel (ln(1 + iki)), first 12 months  
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c)  Response of European tourist arrivals to a temporary unit increase in the 
number of suspected Islamists arrested (ln(1 + cas)), first 12 months   35
Appendix I : Testing the Validity of some of the Assumptions Embodied in the 
Regression Equations 
 
The most substantial restriction embodied in model presented in the main text is that 
the distribution of individual idiosyncratic preferences for each location (uimt) is 
independent of the others. In other words, the idiosyncratic component of the utility 
that individual i  derives from location m  (relative to some numeraire location) is 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic component of the utility that the individual derives 
from location n. This assumption can be relaxed. Following Maddala (1983), we can 
consider a multivariate generalisation of the Weibull Distribution. Suppose for 
example that there are four locations, and that 
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In this Generalised Extreme Value Distribution (GEV), the parameters  and  and 
capture the degree of likeness among the members of a group of similar locations. 
When  →1 or  → 1, then there is a group of locations which are virtually identical 
(in respect of those characteristics which drive the idiosyncratic component of 
individual utility levels). When  =  = 0, then G(·) is linear in the exp(–uimt) and the 
model collapses to the linear form given in equation (3). The two non-degenerate 
forms of G(·) correspond to two possible patterns of location grouping: either a 
singleton and a triplet (i) or two pairs (ii). 
  Within each group, the ratios of the number of people visiting each location 
will still be linear in the mt. In case (i) for example, if we normalise on 4t, the shares 
for choices 2–4 are characterised by the linear equation: 
 
ln(pmt) – ln(p4t) = mt / [1 – ], m = 2,3                    (A2)   36
By contrast, the equation for the singleton’s share will be non-linear, with 
 
ln(p1t) – ln(p4t) = 1t +  · ln(1 – p1t) – ln(p4t)                     (A3) 
 
The validity of the model in the text therefore depends on either the universal 
independence of the uimt distributions, or else that Egypt, Malta and Thailand belong 
to the same group within a GEV framework. This is a necessary condition for the 
validity of the log-linear functional form in equation (5) of the text, and in Tables 1-4. 
(The jointly sufficient conditions are independence plus the linearity of the mt (·) 
functions.) If the countries belong to different groups, or if some distribution more 
complex than GEV applies, then a linear model will no longer be valid. In the text, we 
assume that the uimt are independent of each other and the mt (·) functions are linear. 
This null hypothesis can be tested by applying a RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) to the 
models in Tables 1-4. If our models pass a RESET test, then we cannot reject the null. 
  Table A1 reports the results of RESET tests applied to all of the models in 
Tables 1-4. For each model, we report the p-value corresponding to the null that the 
regression equations are indeed linear. It can be seen that none of the test statistics is 
significant, even at the 10% level. We conclude that the assumptions embodied in the 
main text are reasonable. 
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Table A1: P-values of RESET Tests for the Models in Table 1 – Table 4 
  American sample  European sample 
  Malta as a 
comparison 
Thailand as a 
comparison 
Malta as a 
comparison 
Thailand as a 
comparison 
Unrestricted 
model  0.130 0.542 0.572 0.369 
Restricted 




Appendix II: Descriptive Statistics for the Variables of Interest  
Sample period: 1991m1 – 2000m12 
 
  alternative measures of ln(pm/pn) 
  American sample  European sample 
  Malta as a 
comparison 
Thailand as a 
comparison 
Malta as a 
comparison 
Thailand as a 
comparison 
mean  -4.043 -7.349 -4.365 -6.807 
s.d.   0.351   0.278   0.665   0.528 
  violence variables 
  ln (1 + cas)  ln (1 + tkw)  ln (1 + iki)  
mean   3.669   0.295   0.511   
s.d.   1.885   0.795   0.782     38
Appendix III : The Stability of the Parameters in the Regression Equations 
 
Table A3 presents the results of Chow Test statistics for parameter stability in each of 
the regression equations in Tables 1-4 of the main text. These are based on a 
comparison of the parameter estimates in the tables with estimates based on a 
restricted sample excluding the last 12 months of the sample (that is, the observations 
for the year 2000). It can be seen that there is no evidence for any parameter 
instability, except in the case of the Europeans / Malta regressions. Figures A1-A2 
provide further information about this case, focussing on the restricted regression on 
the right hand side of Table 3. Figures A1 shows one-step forecast errors for the 
Europeans / Malta series for each month of 2000, that is, forecasts for month t based 
on a regression fitted to a sample ending in month t-1. Figure A2 shows 
corresponding recursive parameter estimates, showing how the different parameter 
estimates change as the sample is lengthened. It can be seen that the Chow Test 
failure is due to very large forecast errors in two months (May and September); 
otherwise, forecast errors are relatively small, and there is no significant change in the 
estimate of any individual slope coefficient. In other words, the year 2000 did not fit 
the normal seasonal pattern, but the parameters of interest appear still to be stable.  
 
 
Table A3: P-values of Chow Tests for the Models in Table 1 – Table 4 
  American sample  European sample 
  Malta as a 
comparison 
Thailand as a 
comparison 
Malta as a 
comparison 
Thailand as a 
comparison 
Unrestricted 
model  0.441 0.397 0.011 0.966 
Restricted 
model  0.380 0.496 0.011 0.969 
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Figure A2: Recursive Parameter Estimates in the Europeans / Malta Regression  
with  2 s.e. Bars 
 